

SUE HISTORY

Vol. 3

# ARCHIVES

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HISTORY 1

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FROM ORIGIN

TO

SUBJECT

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S. O. E.

EARLY HISTORY TO SEPTEMBER 1940

INTRODUCTION

D section began in April 1938 as an internal section of SIS. The late ONS had come to the conclusion that some form of organization was needed to counteract the more violent activities of the Nazi party. D section was not an offspring of the war. It was initiated in peacetime and was designed to operate in peacetime. It was the outbreak of war and the extension in importance of D activities that made it necessary to alter the original conception of its activities and to regularise them under a Minister. This recognition of the large part that could be played in the war by organised sabotage led to the formation in July 1940 of SOE.

The original object of D section was to provide lines of communication for covert anti-Nazi propaganda in Neutral countries and to direct and harness the efforts of the various anti-Nazi organisations then working in Europe. It was essentially a weapon of offence. At the same time, it was decided to develop sabotage devices and this also came within the charter of D section. Thus at the outbreak of war the section was working with two objects, the development of devices and the introduction of illegal matter into neutral states. Simultaneously the War Office was developing a department under Lt. Col Holland known as MIR, which was to undertake sabotage and guerrilla warfare in countries after their occupation by the enemy, when D section would cease to operate. Today, SOE is a combination of D section and MIR, although it possesses far more money and power than either of these bodies ever did.

In April 1938 the late chief of the Secret Intelligence Service invited Major GRAND "to cogitate upon the possibilities of sabotage". GRAND's early training had been in Imperial Chemical War Research and the R.E.S. Woolwich, and he had had experience as a Royal Engineer in France,

Russia and the Middle East and on the Indian frontier.

MAJOR GRAND'S SURVEY

At the beginning of the following June the War Office enquired whether GRAND's services with M.I.4. would be wanted after June 7th. He was therefore asked to furnish a preliminary note on his researches, but (as this might be delayed by the necessity for collation by the various sections) the War Office were told that GRAND would be wanted for a further two months with an option until December 31st.

GRAND's preliminary survey showed that he had already appreciated the value of interference with electric supplies and telephone communications, the adulteration of food, the sabotage of industrial installations by the introduction of camouflaged explosives or by forest fires (in the case of factories concealed in forests), the sabotage of railways by explosives disguised as coal or by interference with points, the introduction of deleterious substances into the lubricating or fuel system of warships and aeroplanes, the introduction of diseases into crops and animals, incendiarism in dockyards and the distribution of rumours and forged ration cards. These activities, suitably publicised, would lead to a feeling of disgust and the use of numbers of troops as guards.

He divided the work into three classes:-

- (1) General sabotage, which he thought could be best carried out by the Communist organisation in Germany
- (2) Special sabotage, for which lone workers would be required
- (3) Moral sabotage, which would require one man in every town with an automatic telephone exchange, and might be suitable work for the Jews.

Dumps of sabotage material would have to be set up as follows:-

- (1) In Scandinavia, for Swedish iron ore shipments, Finnish food shipments and the passing of supplies to German workers in Hamburg, Kiel etc.
- (2) In Eastern Czechoslovakia or Hungary, to deal with Roumanian oil and food supplies from the Rumberg and Italy
- (3) In Belgium or Switzerland, to introduce sabotage devices to workers in Southern Germany, the Ruhr, the Saar etc.

This survey was passed to the various sections of the Secret Service who commented variously that it was ambitious, that it merely scratched the surface, that it went too far and too fast, that it was too wide or that too much of it was of doubtful practicality. One officer took the line that he was against active preparations in peacetime; another declared that there were no Communist or anti-Nazi organisations in Germany, while a third thought that the organisation of sabotage within Germany should be left to the anti-Nazi organisations, one of which he had reason to believe was considering the problem.

On October 19th 1938 GRAND circulated a minute in which he reported technical progress in methods to carry out the schemes which he had suggested. The organisation required for the section's activities in peace and in the preparatory stages for war had been considered, and the task divided itself into the establishment of wire communications from England to the neutral countries surrounding Germany and from those countries to Germany itself. The appointment had been requested of three representatives of (at an annual cost of £2,000 each) covering in the first instance Scandinavia and the Baltic, in the second Roumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia and in the third Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Switzerland. A Fleet Street agency had begun work on a survey of the press of the world. It was proposed to spend £250 on surveying all the anti-Nazi movements throughout Europe. A card index was being established of persons who had influence in various quarters such as the Vatican, the intellectual section of the Communist party, the Trade Union movement etc. There were hopes of using the Jews and the Roman Catholics for a whispering organisation throughout Germany. £2,000 were to be spent on experimental work in connection with Airsone, and £1,000 would be required for initial stocks. An individual was to be appointed (at a cost of £600 a year) to investigate the transport of material from England to representatives abroad.

"WHISPERING" AND SABOTAGE

On November 4th 1938 GRAND put forward a scheme for enlarging the

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whispering organization in Germany. The general idea was that one man should be selected in London or a neutral country who had three friends with contacts with Germany; each of these three would in turn recruit not more than three others, and so on. Each man would pass on to his three recruits any rumour which he received from his superior. In this way the organization would be kept in water-tight compartments, as each individual's identification would be known only to his recruiter and to those whom he recruited. All communications would be verbal, and each individual would be free to decide whether to pass on any message he might receive. Any individual who had already been recruited but was approached by another recruiter must not disclose his employment, but might either say he preferred not to act or might accept the fresh offer - but pass on no messages from the second recruiter.

On the same date GRANT asked Z. (Col. DANKERT) whether he had any contacts in industries connected with oil, rubber, aluminium, railways, margarine and edible oils, power houses, naval engine rooms and foundries. It was wished to be ready to supply them with sabotage materials.

Answering these two minutes Z. said that he had been tempted to start whispering, but had been restrained by the likelihood that the whisperer might be made a fool of by a subsequent announcement by the British Cabinet. Furthermore he doubted whether a "Mafia-like" organization was required for whispering. As regarded active sabotage, he thought this must be merged with national policy. Since Munich he had felt that it was quite wrong to supply materials to those who were at present willing to use them, because it would not agree with what appeared to be the existing policy. He did not like to encourage human beings to risk their lives unnecessarily, and under present conditions it would be a dangerous game because the materials would be in the hands of men whose interests were to torpedo Mr. CHAMBERLAIN's efforts for peace.

To this GRANT pointed out that active sabotage was a matter on which they had been instructed to work and that no question of the immediate distribution of stocks had been raised in his memorandum.

# II. ORGANISATION

GRAND recruited two technicians, one a civil expert in telecommunications (Mr. W. SCHROETER), the other a naval expert in explosives and the chemistry of incendiaries (Lt. Cdr. A.J.C. LANGLEY, R.N.). Other men, and women too, were gradually enlisted for their intimate knowledge of the peoples of those countries in which the war was to be fought. During the Munich crisis GRAND organized a pyramidal sabotage network throughout the main Skoda armament factories in Czechoslovakia.

## THE BEGINNING

At the beginning of July 1939 it was clear that war was extremely probable and the activities of the section were therefore increased. The problems were:-

- (1) Obtaining and training sufficient personnel;
- (2) Increasing communications into Germany;
- (3) Intensifying propaganda;
- (4) Arranging for war expansion.

The personnel problem was solved by establishing a Territorial system by which suitable individuals were trained in peacetime, and nine persons were obtained who in civil life were the heads of big organisations. With a number of selected individuals, specialised knowledge of practically all the big industries was represented.

It was not until September 1939 that the organisation which had been born almost "in a shed at the bottom of a garden" was enlarged to the status of a section and a self-sufficient department of war. Recruitment was still gradual; no professional saboteurs existed in Britain, and as a nation we had not only distrusted political propaganda and felt a distaste for it but we had obstinately refused to comprehend it. The functions of the section were only gradually detached from the general background of war. Even at this stage the writer of this earlier history complained that some of the section's most vital projects had been vetoed almost at zero hour for political reasons; at the same time some of its most valuable projects had been remote from the sphere of sabotage and propaganda.

The section was originally conceived as has been seen, as an integral though distinct branch of the Secret Service, to whom it was indebted for patient guidance and co-operation. In its turn the section was able to maintain a regular flow of valuable information from the constant expedition of its officers or agents into all the countries of Europe, from the intimate relations the section had established with virtually every anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist organisation in Europe, from the development and exploitation of the Secret Underground.

And from this section's contacts with its sabotage and propaganda sub-agents resident in enemy or enemy-occupied countries. In July 1940 an officer was appointed by SIS to act as liaison with D. section. His charter enabled him to consult and advise in matters of policy and generally to pave the way towards more perfect co-operation between all Sections.

#### CONTACTS

During November and December 1939 a branch was established under Lt. Col. M. R. CHIDSON, D.S.O., M.B.E. and Capt. T. B. BIRLEY to deal with various activities in the United Kingdom such as the handling of entire organisations, the contacting of individuals and various problems involving secret action in England, such as the secret shipping of stores. By August 1940 the section had established working relations with ten political organisations of a Labour, Catholic, Jewish or extreme nature in Great Britain and over twenty others abroad, including the International Transport Workers' Federation in England, the L.E.X. group in Germany, the Social Democrats and Slovaks organisations in Austria, the Czechoslovakian and Polish organisations in Hungary, the Poles and Communists in Romania, Christiana e Liberta and the Slovenes in Latvia and Italy as well as other organisations in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Palestine and Egypt, including Mahallists in Bulgaria, with the object of developing communications, propaganda and sabotage, receiving information and supplying personnel and ultimately stimulating revolt. Even as early as 1939 the section was able to obtain passive resistance, demonstrations, the chalking up of anti-Nazi slogans and other disturbances as well as strikes and other "outrages" in Germany and

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Occupied Territories

1st  
ADDITIONAL

The early days of (as it was then called) were spent figuratively and literally in the cellar of 5th headquarters at Broadway Buildings. As the section achieved more and more independence and enlarged its personnel and activities, it became necessary to find outside offices, particularly as it became clear that, with the outbreak of war, the section would receive some autonomy.

Therefore, in April 1939, offices were found on the 6th floor of No. 3 Dering Street, which was reached by an obscure passage to the 5th Emden Hotel. These offices remained the Headquarters of the London Office during the whole period under review. In 1940 the expansion of personnel made it necessary to obtain more space, and an internal stairway was constructed to the floor below which was also taken over. The section were fortunate in the way of air damage during the blitz, and suffered materially only from one near-miss which struck Transport House adjoining. No more than superficial damage was done to D offices, although some officers were surprised to find on their desks files of the Rajpata Railway (1884-5) etc.

In common with most organisations during the immediately pre-war period, D section expected the outbreak of war to be accompanied by the immediate bombardment and destruction of London. Therefore for some time previously, steps had been taken to draw up a plan of evacuation to country estates. This plan was the responsibility and achievement of Squadron Leader P.O. ROWE. On Sept. 1, ROWE requisitioned a Residential Private Hotel near Welwyn. This hotel, The Frythe, was requisitioned and became the headquarters of the section. The house, built in the worst Victorian neo-gothic style of ornamental red-brick, possessed fairly extensive grounds and was well-concealed from the public eye. It had two entrances, one from the Great North road, and one from a country lane. A guard was supplied by the Bede & Herts Regiment. The house, though unattractive from the aesthetic point of view, was well supplied with hot water and served as an adequate, if somewhat crowded, headquarters. Until it was clear that the blitz was not immediately

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Furthermore, the section lived and worked at the Frythe, commuting to London only for essential contacting. The more plutocratic members had already agreed to lend their cars to the section (such was the urgency!) so transport was not lacking. Compensation was almost entirely moral! A private line to Broadway and an internal exchange were provided, while a Post Office Box was hired as a cover address for the Section. For officers' recreation, a dart board and table tennis set was provided, while the usual indoor sports and pastimes were popular.

For the period during which the Frythe was D HQ, the section lived in what would now be regarded as luxury, although at that time the contrast with peacetime conditions was more acute. No incidents occurred except an outbreak of sentry-baiting, which led to considerable alarm but was finally traced to the outraged manager of the Hotel, who had strenuously resisted the summary ejection of his residents. Brevity trip-wires and live ammunition, his knowledge of the terrain, coupled with the inexperience of raw soldiery stationed in dark Autumn nights amidst the witchlike rhododendrum bushes, enabled the Manager to cause demoralisation by ghostly whistling, banshee wailing and stealthy prowling round the house. He even managed on one occasion to assault the armed and expectant sentry, making his escape down "spook alley" with a gleeful sneer of sly laughter. Finally the police were brought in and he was discouraged from further activity. The Station was under the Command of Lt. Col. M.E. CHURCH.

Other houses were requisitioned at a later date. The devices section under Commander LANGLEY, E.M., were accommodated at Aston House, which was requisitioned in October. The Propaganda section obtained the cream of the accommodation at the Old Rectory, Hertingfordbury; a beautiful little house in delightful grounds. This was taken over in Mid-September.

In March 1940 it was decided that the work of various sub-sections of D section could be more effectively carried out in London and therefore certain members of the staff moved back from the country and a second floor was acquired to accommodate them and various new recruits.

#### INTER-SERVICE PROJECTS BOARD

In April 1940 the formation of the Inter-Services Projects Board was imminent. It was proposed that its membership should include representatives of the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, F.I.C., C.S. and the War Office. The Board was to be primarily consultative and advisory, its objects being:-

- (1) To co-ordinate projects for attacking the enemy by irregular operations.
- (2) To prevent the lapsing of any project of value.
- (3) To provide Service planning staffs with advice and intelligence derived from the exchange of ideas between members of the Board.
- (4) To ensure that the operations of each service were complementary to the others.

#### SECTION SUBDIVIDED

In April 1940, to relieve GRAID of the burden of departmental detail, it was found necessary to make a basic alteration in the organization. Section D. was therefore divided into four sub-sections on a functional basis as opposed to the mixed geographical divisions, and each of the sub-sections was placed in the charge of a senior officer known as an "Assistant D". Heads of Sections were to appeal in the first instance to the appropriate "Assistant D".

The expansion of the war field led to the creation of two new sub-sections, the first to deal with Italy and the second to deal with the Caucasus and South Russia.

#### INVASION PRECAUTIONS

In May 1940, with a view to arranging a centre for the continuation of the section's activities should the Government decide to move to the west, a search began for a suitable house. Preparations were made to fortify Station IX against air-raids and enemy attack. The defences of station XII were considerably increased and arrangements were made to demolish the outlying magazines by closing a switch in the main building in the event of enemy attack. By the following month the plans for

evacuations were made and a large number of people, including the fourteen people (for GRAND and his immediate staff), had been requisitioned and furnished in the west of England.

As, under the existing system, it appeared that there was too much duplication and waste in the collection of information required for plans by the Service departments, a meeting was held in June 1940 between GRAND, Captain BOKX (Admiralty) and Commander ARNOLD-PORTER and it was decided that the section's Technical Planning section should undertake to supply information to General BOURNE, Director of Combined Operations. Since then a great deal of information has been submitted.

#### REORGANISATION OF THE SECTION

On July 17th the formation of a Special Operations Executive was approved by the Cabinet, and it was decided that a Minister should be appointed to co-ordinate the activities of M.I.B., Electra House, the D.C.O. and D. section. The Minister for Economic Warfare (at that time Dr. HUGH DALTON) was appointed. As a result of his appointment, the following month a certain reorganisation was considered necessary. An assistant "D" was appointed to deal with the major part of the routine work and the section was then divided into five directorates:-

- (1) The Director of Plans was to be responsible for the dissemination of general information to the sub-sections and for supplying plans and technical information on such projects as might be submitted.
- (2) The Director of Operations was to be in charge of the Country sections and the organisation available through them for the execution of projects.
- (3) The Director of Organisation was to be generally responsible for the co-ordination of departments and for administration, personnel, transport, accounts etc.
- (4) The Director of Services was to co-ordinate the activities of the various propaganda sub-sections and also possibly those of the officers planning and producing devices at Stations IX and XII, and the Salmon Warfare Station.
- (5) The Director of Special Projects was to be responsible for those undertakings which required individual attention and were outside the scope of the Plans Directorate.

As a result of this reorganisation the sub-sections which had been working as Section II were removed to the London office, with the exception of that dealing with radio development.

APPOINTMENT OF SIR FRANK NELSON

Towards the end of the month the MINISTER appointed SIR FRANK NELSON with the symbol C.D.) as commanding officer of the section, and he assumed his duties on August 28th

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During the period under review April 1948 - September 1948 the  
 section achieved some notable results, of which the following were selected  
 as being of importance and recorded in August 1948

1. £500,000 worth of industrial diamonds were brought out of Germany  
 £25,000,000 worth of gold bars were brought out under the name of  
 German diamonds by an officer in the 1st British Army to leave  
 Germany
2. A I.R. an official station for German war material in the  
 one I.R. was established as a branch of the war material  
 under the name of I.R.
3. Instructions for proceedings against an escapee produced by the  
 section's sabotage section only divisions were accepted by I  
 and were circulated to all units of the section
4. A purported exposure of the growing influence of the German  
 Oxford Group was reported
5. The processes and potentialities of the secret German war  
 were to be at the disposal of the secret service
6. A thousand photographic copies of a secret German text of the  
 whole Nazi hierarchy inside Germany was produced by the section  
 in touch with the German foreign political organization in the  
 British
7. Up-to-date knowledge of good targets was obtained by an officer  
 in the course of his routine employment of arms etc. into Germany
8. The Joint Broadcast by German radio, known as the German Secret,  
 came under the control of the Ministry of Information
9. At the time of German Colonel von G. conceived the plan of  
 organizing throughout Great Britain a sabotage unit to be placed  
 network among the German population to be left behind in the  
 occupied territory, and the officers of the section accepted  
 an organization and distributed a vast quantity of sabotage  
 material in over a thousand secret dumps throughout the country  
 This organization was taken over by the newly constituted band  
 of the War Office, the Auxiliary unit
10. The only officer who has so far lost his life had been  
 receiving an expedition by an in an attempt to rescue the family  
 of General DE WILHELM from German occupation France
11. The Section a supply division for sabotage devices had educated  
 hundreds of officers and agents and had produced a considerable  
 quantity of material

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D DETAILED HISTORY

In the following pages are given more detailed stories of the work of the various sections, territorial or otherwise. The work of propaganda is dealt with separately for the most part, and not under the countries concerned.

Summary

During the four weeks ending September 3rd 1939 two and a half tons of material (mostly propaganda) were run into Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia by main line through Switzerland (two lines), Belgium (Antwerp, one line) and Holland (one line). At the outbreak of war all channels ceased for about ten days, partly because of the arrest of key personnel and partly because of the chaos which prevented transport in and out of England. The lines were however re-established and by October were as follows -

Switzerland - Germany	..	2
Switzerland - Italy	..	1
Belgium - Germany	..	1
Holland - Germany	..	1
Yugoslavia - Italy	.	1
Sweden - Austria	.	1
Sweden - Latvia	.	1

These routes had capacities varying from a man-carried package to packing-cases measured in hundredweights. During November and December 1939 some of the existing channels were closed but the following new lines were opened up:-

Yugoslavia - Hungary
Hungary - Czechoslovakia
Hungary - Poland
Hungary - Austria
Yugoslavia - Austria
Sweden - Germany
Sweden - Latvia
England - Norway

The last line made use of an official service to the Shetlands, a non-official service in the Shetlands, a hidden store in the Shetlands and a Norwegian coasting boat; a connection of the line ran through Norway to Stockholm. Earlier in the year a band of yachtsmen under ROGER BAKER, and JOHN C. MURPHY had carried out work in connection with the landing of goods on the coasts of Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium which had been highly praised by the Admiralty.

The extension of the war front in May 1940 considerably curtailed the activities of couriers, and the services to Holland and Belgium had to be abandoned when those countries were invaded. During the first fortnight

they became irregular owing to difficulties in Italy, and in June they were entirely suspended. Flying boat services for materials and for personnel were used. In July communications were still greatly restricted, and only fourteen passages of any importance were taken. Arrangements were, however, made to conduct a form of courier service to the Balkans via Cairo, hitherto the representatives had to proceed to Cairo by sea via the Gold Coast or the Cape and thence by air to Egypt.



## HOME DEFENCE

In May 1940 a plan of campaign was formulated to instruct the civil population on the subject of resistance in the event of an invasion. At a meeting of the Interservices Projects Board held on May 27th it was agreed that a force should be formed, to act in close co-operation with the military authorities, to deal with the enemy in the case of invasion or occupation of parts of England. This force was to be divided into two main sub-sections, - the M.I.R.s who would wage guerrilla warfare, and selected D. officers who would be attached for special duty to the twelve Regional Civil Commissioners. Under this plan a D. officer would work under the Regional Commissioner until the area passed under martial law, when he would serve under the military commander. Within smaller areas of the region he would organise a chain of individuals not liable to be called up for military service who would carry out acts of sabotage, and by judicial whispering he would encourage the general public unconsciously to train their minds to attack the enemy by unarmed methods. He would arrange a headquarters storehouse for ammunition etc. These officers were provided with cars.

In the following months the work of the Home Defence sub-section progressed satisfactorily, and the organisation for civil home defence grew steadily. In the third week of July nearly 100 key men had been appointed and at least 1,000 dumps of material had been placed in the care of people capable of using them. Approximately 1,000 parts of sulphuric acid, 90,000 capsules with which to prepare a minimum of 45,000 petrol bombs, 45,000 tyres and 45,000 incendiary bombs were provided. Officers of the section had recruited clergymen, caretakers, postmen, dentists and road makers.

In July it was decided by the authorities that the risk of reprisals incurred by allowing civilians to engage in sabotage activities was too great. It was therefore decided that M.I.R. and D section home activities should be united and called C.M. Auxiliary Units under Colonel M.P.E. and the members would be selected from Home Guard Units. However, to ensure

Viscount HEARSTEND continued his organisation on bloc under the name of "Auxiliary Units (Special Duties)". It was not until the danger of invasion was relatively past that the organisation as originally planned by B section was dissolved.

In the second half of 1939 investigations were completed by Lt. Col. JAMES O'HARA of a project to employ incendiary free balloons on a large scale, and the French technical authorities, M. DOLLFUS, completely agreed as to its practicability and importance. A detailed scheme was submitted to the War Office on September 25th and a station established at Savoy Farm, Dorken. Later, with a view to getting over the difficulty of hydrogen supplies in outlandish areas, a successful hot-air balloon was developed. At the beginning of 1940 considerable improvements were reported in the hot-air balloons, and one had been launched with a ground wind of 40 miles and been picked up 45 miles away. They were cheap to produce as they could be made of paper panels. In April 1940 it was reported that hot-air balloon exercises had been carried out in France, and that eight launches had been effected with balloons of different sizes and shapes and different burners; the longest flight had been made by an elongated 1,600 cubic-foot balloon carrying 3 lbs. and fitted with a petrol burner. The distance attained was 110 miles.

Meanwhile, in March 1940, a new idea had been put forward by Flight Lieutenant T.R. BIRD for ammonia-hydrogen balloons which would maintain a constant altitude by the replacement of part or all of the hydrogen or coal gas by ammonia. As the boiling point of ammonia is  $33.50^{\circ}\text{C}$ . and this temperature is reached at a height of 22,000 feet, the balloon would be kept in equilibrium by the alternate liquification and reevaporation of the ammonia as it rose into the lower temperature of a higher altitude or fell into the higher temperature of a lower altitude. In April, however, it was reported that the ammonia-hydrogen balloon idea seemed likely to be superseded by a system involving an auxiliary lifting balloon which would be cut loose when the main balloon reached the desired height, the main balloon then continuing its course at a constant level.

CONCLUSION

Towards the end of 1939 a section was established to investigate the possibilities of the postal censorship from the point of view of information and of trade and moral sabotage against the Germans.

In March 1940 two additional personnel to the word and the department were sent to Gibraltar and the extension of operations to Lisbon was suggested.

The invasion of the low countries ended certain activities but information was collected and distributed from Rome, Berlin, Madrid, Dublin etc. Four women members of the staff were recruited during May 1940.

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THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

Under the isolated instances it was unnecessary for the section to organize its own means of telegraphic or postal communication, as the facilities had been put at its disposal. The work of the telecommunications department was therefore almost exclusively on research, and the director in charge of it, Mr. WATSON, had made considerable progress on three inventions in little more than a year. They were -

- a The E-Phone a telephone which left scrambled & far behind and carried and directed the spoken voice in any code which the user chose to insert in the mechanism.
- (b) The Duplex transceiver a wireless telephone using a wave too short to be picked up by any other kind of receiver. It was an instrument of strictly limited range as yet, or possibly soon to be seen agents operating in foreign countries.
- c A high powered loud speaker to be used for mass broadcast propaganda launched either automatically by dropping balloons or by the pilot of an aeroplane. Even at ground level it has a range of intelligible speech of 10 miles.

## SPECIAL TRAINING SCHOOL

In June 1940 it was decided to establish a school to train a number of different nationalities as instructors and recruits. They were to be equipped and returned to their own countries in order to stir up revolution and commit specific acts of sabotage. A house was requisitioned in Hertfordshire, suitable staff were recruited, and activities were to begin in the immediate future. In the following month preparations were being completed. A commandant, Col. FORTY, and an Adjutant (Major BARRETT) had been appointed, and three staff officers (WILL, BURTON and PHILBY) would instruct students in various sections of the syllabus. This had been planned on a six weeks basis and was divided into three parts:

- (1) Training in devices: outdoor and indoor
  - (a) Theoretical: general aims and principles of sabotage
  - (b) Practical: cooking, explosives and signalling
- (2) Part special training: cover, security, contacting and counter-covering
- (3) Instruction in the use of firearms etc.

The first course of instruction started on August 29th and ended on October 12th. Five Norwegians, six Belgians, three Frenchmen and one Scot were attending the course, and five others, at present, joined later. It was hoped to arrange a course of instruction in W/T communication with the assistance of [redacted] This would fall under two heads, - instruction for already qualified operators who would be required to work W/T stations abroad, and a course for selected personnel with probably no previous knowledge. In the event, however, it was not found possible to give any W/T training. Some disciplinary trouble was experienced with the French section, and a number of the staff was removed. It was found that security measures tightening up considerably, and the number of guards was increased.

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The Commandant made a specific request for a better type of man to carry out the underground political warfare. Twenty-two students spent twelve two-hour courses at the Station I1 chalk pit, where it was possible for them to view explosions at a distance of five yards through armour-plated glass.





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- (B) ... ..
- (C) ... ..



The reason for (a) was that he had submitted to the U.S. representative in New York that the postman could possibly deliver the two Dag Hammarskjöld letters (dated 1948 and 1949) which would contain information about the activities of the Swedish. This reason for (a) was that that was the goal of the presidential election and that, since the Swedish Government is in a difficult position, the president would be elected by the Swedish people in order to avoid this. In the historical sense, many meetings at election time, it was not the election against Hammarskjöld. This consideration led to the decision to consider any advantage that might be gained by the election of a new Swedish propaganda leaflet to Hammarskjöld. The reason for (a) was that he had already found evidence in other letters that U.S. had received in connection with the fact and the source stated that they also possessed similar information on Swedish activities. It would therefore be necessary for him to travel to North America to begin to set up a network of contacts and professionals (were already available) in the Swedish way as result of D. Hammarskjöld.

The suggestion was made in May 1940 that the B.B.C. should broadcast an invitation to members of the German Army and Navy to cease fighting and become prisoners-of-war, either by bringing their ships to a certain point or by approaching the French lines, and observing certain formalities. It was expected that this would have a bad effect of German morale.

Towards the middle of 1940 the introduction of propaganda material into Germany became increasingly difficult, but arrangements were made with a sub-agent to post some 2,000 letters a month at various places inside the country.

#### IN HOLLAND

The organization of this section had been established by the beginning of 1940, and deliveries of propaganda letters and leaflets began early in January. A new outlet for propaganda in North German ports was set up but its activities were curtailed by police observation. During March, however, deliveries of letters and leaflets continued and a new outlet for leaflets at the rate of 1,000 a week was established. The average number of stamped addressed letters taken over to Holland during March included 3,000 a week, plus 200 Catholic pamphlets which were transcribed in Holland and brought the weekly total to roughly 10,000.

#### REMOVALS

The new sub-section appointed in May 1940 despatched 2,000 letters, 35,000 stickers and 48 rubber stamps for surcharging anti-British posters, and plans were made for delivering suitcases of materials for storage in Florence.

#### IN SPAIN

In May 1940 a considerable number of leaflets were distributed, and in June the Falange were reported to be considerably disturbed by propaganda activities in Spain. A second representative was sent to